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ABSTRACT 
Although most theoretical models of household decisionmaking assume perfect information, empirical 
studies suggest that information asymmetries can have large impacts on resource allocation. In this study, 
I demonstrate the importance of these asymmetries in transnational households, where physical distance 
between family members can make information barriers especially acute. I implement an experiment 
among migrants in Washington, DC and their families in El Salvador that examines how information 
asymmetries can have strategic and inadvertent impacts on remittance decisions. Migrants make an 
incentivized decision over how much of a cash windfall to remit and recipients decide how to spend a 
remittance. Migrants strategically send home less when their choice is not revealed to recipients but only 
when recipients can punish migrants for deviation from remittance agreements. Recipients make spending 
choices closer to migrants’ preferences when those preferences are revealed, suggesting that recipients’ 
choices are inadvertently affected by imperfect information.  
Keywords:  remittances, intrahousehold allocation, information asymmetries, transnational 
households 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Although the implications of asymmetric information have been well documented in the study of 
important economic institutions such as labor, credit, and insurance markets, theoretical models of 
intrahousehold resource allocation have largely assumed perfect information (Chiappori 1988, 1992; 
Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981; Lundberg and Pollack 1993).
1 Despite this, a 
growing body of empirical literature has shown that information asymmetries do exist in households and, 
further, that household members take strategic advantage of opportunities to use these asymmetries to 
alter the allocation of resources in the household (Ashraf 2009; Ashraf, Field, and Lee 2013; Schaner 
2013). This paper brings the study of how information asymmetries affect intrahousehold resource 
allocation to a different setting: transnational households, defined as households composed of 
international migrants and their family members in the home country, in this case El Salvador. Using 
experimental methods, I examine the effects of a set of information imperfections on remittance decisions 
made by both migrants and their family members. 
The context of transnational households is significant because migrants and their family members 
are making financial decisions in a situation where information asymmetries are especially acute. Because 
of the physical distance separating family members, families with a migrant living away from the 
household are precisely those where information asymmetries may be the most pronounced. A number of 
studies have documented the existence of these asymmetries in households with migrants. For example, 
De Laat (2014) shows that domestic migrants in Kenya spend resources on costly monitoring of their 
wives. Chen (2006, 2013) finds that in China, wives with migrant husbands exhibit noncooperative 
behavior more often for activities that are more difficult to monitor, and Seshan and Yang (2013) find 
suggestive evidence that Indian migrants underestimate how much their wives at home are saving. 
McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2013) find that potential Tongan migrants underestimate earnings in 
New Zealand, a fact the authors partly attribute to underreporting of earnings by current migrants. 
However the empirical analysis in these papers is largely observational. This is the first study to causally 
examine how information asymmetries directly affect behavior, specifically decisions about the sending 
and spending of remittances.  
The importance of understanding how information asymmetries affect decisions in transnational 
households is heightened by the fact that migrants and their family members are financially linked 
through the sending of remittances, a large financial flow. Global aggregate international remittances to 
the developing world were US$332 billion in 2010, more than any other kind of resource flow with the 
exception of foreign direct investment (Ratha and Silwal 2012). In El Salvador specifically, remittances 
received were 16 percent of gross domestic product in 2010 (Ratha and Silwal 2012). In the same year, 21 
percent of households in El Salvador received remittances from abroad and average monthly remittances 
were $166 for families that received them—a figure that is almost 50 percent of average monthly 
household expenditures for remittance recipients (Dirección General de Estadística y Censos 2010). 
Additionally, the receipt of remittances has been shown to have large, positive impacts on a variety of 
measures of well-being, underscoring their importance as a tool for development (Cox-Edwards and Ureta 
2003; Adams and Page 2005; Yang and Martinez 2005; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007; Yang 2008; Adams 
and Cuecuecha 2010). Given the importance of remittances for development, a more complete 
understanding of how these decisions are made is crucial for policymakers who are hoping to maximize 
their economic impact. 
This paper addresses two types of information asymmetries that may affect decisions about the 
sending and spending of remittances. The first are asymmetries that can lead to strategic behavior, 
meaning that migrants and recipients recognize that the asymmetry exists and use it for their benefit. The 
specific asymmetries considered here are the limited abilities of remittance recipients to observe migrant 
income and of migrants to observe recipient spending. The second type are those that can have 
                                                       
1 Exceptions include Bloch and Rao (2002) and Chen (2013).  
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inadvertent impacts, defined as asymmetries that unintentionally affect decisions. These asymmetries are 
represented here as communication barriers that result in recipients having an incomplete understanding 
of migrant preferences for how the remittances they send should be spent. Communication barriers should 
be interpreted broadly as any obstacle—social, financial, or logistical—to understanding these 
preferences. I first describe a simple framework that shows how these two types of information 
asymmetries can affect remittance decisions, and then I test these predictions using experiments 
conducted with a matched sample of migrants from El Salvador and their family members at home. 
The framework views the decisions made by migrants and remittance recipients as being driven 
both by altruism and by contracts that dictate how much of their income migrants should send to 
recipients and what the money should be spent on when received by the recipients. The contracts are 
enforced through the threat of punishment for noncompliance, and migrants and recipients may 
strategically deviate from these agreements when it is not likely their behavior will be observed. 
However, in pairs where the potential for punishment is low, decisions will be motivated mostly by 
altruism, and strategic effects will therefore be less important. Additionally, communication barriers, 
specifically in regard to migrants’ preferences over recipients’ spending habits, may lead to inadvertent 
deviation from migrant preferences by recipients. 
The experiments explicitly test for both strategic and inadvertent responses to information 
asymmetries. They were designed to mimic real-life decisions about remittances made by migrants and 
their family members; and by randomly assigning treatments, I am able to causally identify the impacts of 
the informational conditions being tested. The first experiment was conducted among Salvadoran 
migrants recruited in the Washington, DC, area. The migrants were asked how much of a potential $600 
prize they wished to keep and how much they wished to send to a family member in El Salvador. The 
decision was incentivized, meaning that participants had the chance to win the allocation that they chose. 
To test whether migrants strategically react to changes in the observability of their income, they were 
randomly allocated into two treatment groups: those who were told their decision would not be revealed 
to their family and those who were told that their decision would be revealed.  
These family members then participated in a second experiment. They made an incentivized 
decision about how to spend a potential $300 remittance prize. To test for strategic reactions to the 
observability of their spending choices, as in the migrant experiment, half of the recipients were told that 
their choice would not be revealed to the migrant, and the other half were told that their choice would be 
revealed. In a second, cross-randomized treatment addressing the inadvertent effects of communication 
barriers, half of the recipients were informed of the migrant’s preferences for how the money should be 
spent, and the others were not. 
I find that migrants remit $20 more on average out of the possible $600 (an increase of 5 percent 
over the control group mean of $440 sent) when their decisions are revealed. This effect is concentrated 
(and larger) in subsamples where the recipient’s ability to punish the migrant for deviation is plausibly 
high. There is no corresponding evidence of strategic behavior in the recipient experiment. However, 
reducing communication costs by revealing migrant preferences to recipients does have an impact, 
resulting in a 10 percent reduction in the difference between migrant preferences and recipient choices. 
This paper is related to a set of field experiments that have examined the effects of offering 
migrants varying degrees of control over remittances. The idea behind these experiments is that offering 
control to migrants will mitigate a moral hazard problem in how recipients spend remittances. Ashraf et 
al. (2011) show that savings levels in bank accounts in El Salvador increase when migrants are given 
greater control over these accounts. Chin et al. (2011) find that the impacts of an experiment that offered 
migrants assistance in opening bank accounts in the United States are concentrated among migrants who 
report having no control over how their remittances are spent. However, in a lab experiment, Torero and 
Viceisza (2011) find little evidence that Salvadoran migrants send more when they are able to control 
how remittances are spent but attribute this to the fact that the control offered by their experiment was too 
limiting.  
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The main limitation of these papers is that while their premise is that migrants might have 
difficulty controlling the spending of remittances, they do not consider that information problems might 
run in both directions. The observational studies documenting information asymmetries in migrant 
households have also focused on migrant monitoring of recipient behavior (Chen 2006, 2013; de Laat 
2008). One of the principal contributions of this paper is that it examines the impacts of information 
asymmetries on both sides of the migrant–recipient relationship. In fact, in this experiment, it is only 
migrants—and not recipients—who react strategically to whether or not their choices will be monitored. 
This demonstrates that recipients have important influence in the migrant–recipient relationship, 
something that has not previously been demonstrated empirically. 
This paper also fits into a growing, broader literature on how information asymmetries affect 
resource allocation in families. Ashraf (2009) shows that in the Philippines, men whose wives are the 
household financial managers hide income from their wives when that decision is private. When their 
decision is public, men choose to divert income to committed consumption that cannot be undone. Only 
when spouses communicate about their choices before they make them do men choose to share the 
income with their wives. Schaner (2013) finds that spouses are more likely to choose to save in individual 
(as opposed to joint) savings accounts when they are not well informed about each other’s finances.
2 Also 
related, Jakiela and Ozier (2012) find that women in Kenya sacrifice investment returns to keep income 
secret from family members outside their household and avoid the pressure to share that income. 
This study builds on the literature in several ways. First, while these studies focus on strategic 
behavior; I study responses to different types of information asymmetries, strategic and inadvertent, 
allowing me to evaluate the relative effects in the same population. Second, these papers largely focus on 
a single choice in the resource allocation process (whether or not to share income); the present experiment 
considers how information asymmetries can affect two different decisions made by families about 
economic resources. Finally, this study documents that information asymmetries can be important outside 
of the husband–wife pair, which has been the context of most previous experimental work in this area.
3 
People in developing countries often transfer resources within extended families, and therefore decisions 
about resource allocation consequently are likely to involve people beyond just the husband and wife. The 
results show that information asymmetries can have important impacts in extended families, but because 
migrants react to being monitored only when the recipients’ ability to punish them is high, the results also 
indicate that asymmetries may not matter in all families where resources are shared. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes a framework for understanding the empirical 
results. Section 3 explains the experiment. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 
5 presents and discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                       
2 In another experiment in Zambia, women are more likely to take advantage of vouchers for contraception and use 
concealable forms of contraception when these vouchers are given to them outside of the presence of their husbands, showing 
that strategic reactions to information asymmetries extend beyond simply the allocation of funds in the household (Ashraf, Field 
and Lee 2012). 
3 The dynamics of transfer arrangements in extended family networks has been studied (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001), but 
little is known about how information imperfections affect behavior in these arrangements. The notable exception is Jakiela and 
Ozier (2012), but the main focus of that paper is investment decisions, as opposed to sharing and spending decisions.  
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2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section I describe the intuition behind a simple model that frames my experimental results. A 
detailed exposition of the model can be found in Appendix B. The intent of the model is to show that the 
probability that recipients observe migrant income and the probability that migrants observe recipient 
spending can impact migrant sending and recipient spending decisions. The structure of the model is 
based on Chen’s (2013) description of how male migrants in China monitor their wives’ behavior. 
Specifically, Chen shows that when a migrant has imperfect information about his wife’s actions and 
incomplete information about her preferences, the contract offered to the wife may not always be 
incentive compatible. I adapt a simplified version of this model to describe the outcomes considered in 
this paper. 
In this framework, the migrant’s decision about how much to send home in remittances is 
determined by a combination of altruism and a contract with the recipient that is enforced through the 
threat of punishment. One example of such a cost is substandard care for or attention to people (children 
or elderly relatives) or possessions (land, livestock, or new investments) left by the migrant in the care of 
his family. Another is social sanctions against the migrant: many migrants come from areas with high 
rates of migration and strong social norms and expectations regarding the amount of money that migrants 
send home. Particularly for migrants who wish to return home one day, a damaged reputation may be 
seen as quite costly. Finally, migrants who refuse to send home as much money as their families expect 
may damage their relationships with their families, relationships that migrants with tenuous positions in 
foreign countries may view as important.
4 Many of these potential punishments are related to the social 
closeness of migrants and recipients, and indeed, in a qualitative study of Ghanaian migrants in the 
Netherlands, Mazzucato (2009) emphasizes the importance of the social proximity of migrants and 
recipients for the effective enforcement of remittance agreements.
5 
The amount that the migrant is compelled to send through the contract depends on the size of the 
punishment: The greater the ability of the recipient to punish, the more the recipient can push the migrant 
past the amount the migrant would choose to send voluntarily. These contracts are defined based on the 
migrants’ earnings, which vary over time. Recipients will expect different amounts depending on how 
much a migrant earns in any given period. Because of the geographical distance between migrants and 
recipients, recipients observe migrant income only with a certain probability, and that probability varies 
from period to period.
6 I model this probability as being either high or low. Migrants always know the 
value of this probability, but recipients know only its distribution. If migrant income is not observed by 
the recipient, the recipient must rely only on information from the migrant. Therefore, migrants can 
deviate from the contract by underreporting their income to the recipients and will be discovered and 
punished only if that income is actually observed. 
Recipients must set up these contracts to be incentive compatible: Migrants’ utility from 
compliance must be greater than or equal to the expected utility from deviating. This expected utility will 
be higher when the probability that income will be observed is low; therefore, the cooperation-inducing 
remittance is lower when that probability is low than when it is high. Because recipients do not know the 
                                                       
4 A similar description of enforcement mechanisms can be found in Rapoport and Docquier (2006). Brown (1997), 
Hoddinott (1994), Lucas and Stark (1985), and Poirine (1997) all describe remittance contracts enforced through the discussed 
mechanisms. Additionally, in studies of dictator games within social networks, Leider et al. (2009) and Ligon and Schecter 
(2012) document the importance of the expectation of reciprocity in motivating giving. 
5 Additionally, in focus groups done prior to the start of the project, migrants repeatedly cited high levels of pressure from 
family members as a key reason why they sent remittances home. Relatedly, in their work on Tongan migration to New Zealand, 
McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2013) find suggestive evidence that migrants underreport earnings to avoid pressures from 
family members to remit. 
6 This observation of income will likely occur through the migrant’s social and family network. Given that the networks 
within which migrants in the United States live and work are often closely related to their home country networks (Munshi 2003), 
instances when the probability that income will be observed is quite high are likely.  
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probability of observing migrant income, they must set one contract that satisfies incentive compatibility 
for all migrants and will lose potential surplus when that probability turns out to be high. 
However, one other option is available to the recipients. They can set a contract that binds when 
the probability of observing migrant income is high but that is not incentive compatible when that 
probability is low. Because recipients have to lower the remittance amount so much to induce compliance 
when the probability is low, they may be better off receiving the higher amount only some of the time 
instead of the lower amount all the time. The model leads to two predictions for migrant behavior: First, 
migrants will act strategically and send less money home when the probability that recipients will observe 
their income is low. Second, this will happen only when recipients have power to punish migrants for not 
sending home enough money. If recipients cannot punish migrants, then migrants will send only the 
amount they choose to send altruistically. This altruistic amount will not depend on whether the migrant’s 
income can be observed. 
The decision made by recipients about how to spend the remittances that they receive is modeled 
in a parallel manner. Recipients choose the extent to which they follow the migrants’ preferences for how 
remittances should be spent. Their choice is motivated by altruism (in this case simply the extent to which 
recipients want to follow migrant preferences) and a contract with migrants enforced by the migrant’s 
ability to punish the recipient. The probability that migrants will observe actual recipient spending can be 
either high or low. This probability is known to the recipient, while the migrant knows only its 
distribution. As with the migrant remittance decision, this leads to a situation where migrants may offer 
contracts that are incentive compatible only when the probability that recipient spending will be observed 
is high. The recipient decision may additionally be complicated by barriers to communication that result 
in confusion over what the migrant’s preferences actually are. I will refer to these barriers as 
communication costs, but the concept is broader than just the cost of a telephone call. With distance, 
specificity about preferences may become difficult, migrants may feel uncomfortable expressing what 
they want, and recipients may sometimes have to make decisions without time to directly consult with 
migrants. Family members may also incorrectly assume that they know what the migrant would prefer. If 
the recipient does not know the migrant’s preferences, the preferences will not be followed regardless of 
the recipient’s intentions. 
This setup leads to three predictions for the recipient decision: First, recipients will strategically 
spend less money according to migrant preferences when the probability their spending will be observed 
is low. Second, when migrants cannot punish recipients, the probability that spending will be observed 
will not affect spending decisions because the recipient choice will be strictly voluntary. Finally, if 
recipients do not have full information, they may be inadvertently deviating from migrant preferences. 
Improved information can increase the extent to which recipients follow those preferences. 
The main point of this discussion is that strategic behavior can be a part of the relationship 
between migrants and their family members, but the extent to which it is important will depend on their 
ability to pressure and punish each other. At the same time, communication costs can lead to inadvertent 
deviation when recipients make remittance spending decisions.  
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3.  PROJECT DESIGN 
Given that information asymmetries in transnational families are difficult to measure and may be 
correlated with a number of unobserved characteristics, I implemented a randomized experiment to test 
the predictions of the framework discussed in the previous section. This experiment is conducted within 
the context of survey work for a separate field experiment on remittances and education among 
Salvadoran migrants in Washington, DC, and their families in El Salvador (Ambler, Aycinena, and Yang 
2013). Specifically, I exploit an unusual feature of this data collection exercise; it involves surveys with 
matched pairs of migrants and family members, allowing me to investigate the preferences and choices of 
both. In the experiment, I randomly vary (1) whether migrant income and recipient spending are observed 
and (2) the size of communication costs, allowing me to identify the causal impacts of both of these 
factors on migrant and recipient remittance behavior. Demographic survey data are used to explore how 
impacts vary by punishment ability. 
Migrants were recruited in the Washington, DC, metro area at the two area locations of the 
Salvadoran consulate and were interviewed while they were waiting for consular services.
7 The migrant 
survey was conducted between late September 2011 and late February 2012. Surveyors in the consulate 
approached migrants and invited them to participate. Because the focus of the companion experiment was 
remittances and education, participants were required to name a high school or college-aged relative or 
acquaintance in El Salvador.
8 Those who qualified and agreed to participate were administered a baseline 
survey.
9 The experiment described in this paper was conducted at the end of the survey.  
During the survey migrants identified a high school or college-aged student in El Salvador. 
Although the migrants were not required to select a family member as the student, in practice 97 percent 
did. Interviews were subsequently conducted with the student or a household member. If the student was 
18 years of age or older, the student was to be interviewed; and if under 18, a guardian was identified to 
be interviewed. If the indicated person was not available, an alternative adult in the household was 
interviewed instead. The El Salvador survey was conducted by phone in the days following the migrant 
survey in the United States; the median number of days between the US and El Salvador surveys was 
eight. The El Salvador surveys concluded in mid-March 2012, two weeks after fieldwork ended in the 
United States. The experiment in the El Salvador survey was also at the end of the survey. Figure 3.1 
describes the phases of the project in the order that they occurred for each pair of participants. 
Figure 3.1 Project timeline 
 
Source:  Author. 
 
                                                       
7 The most common reason to go to the consulate is passport renewal, but other services include renewal of temporary 
protected status, registry of births and deaths, and notarization of documents. 
8 Among the migrants approached, 24 percent participated. Of those that did not participate, 77 percent did not know an 
eligible student in El Salvador, 14 percent refused, 7 percent were not from El Salvador, and 2 percent had other reasons.  
9 This was followed by the randomized offer of a product designed to facilitate the sending of remittances for education to 
El Salvador. This was a randomized intervention, and migrants received offers of different versions of the product depending on 
their assigned treatment group. Migrants in a control group received only information and no product offer. 
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Migrant Experiment 
The migrant experiment consisted of an incentivized remittance-sending decision. Migrants were told that 
they were being given the chance to win $600 and would have to decide how much of the prize to keep 
for themselves and how much to remit to their family member in El Salvador. Migrants could split the 
$600 as they wished but were restricted to using $100 intervals for simplicity.
10 The prize was awarded 
through a lottery.
11 Although budgetary restrictions did not allow for all participants to win the prize, the 
use of the lottery incentivized participants to treat this as a real decision. In the Ashraf et al. (2011) study 
of a similar population of Salvadoran migrants, migrant median monthly income was $2,080. 
Consequently, $600 represents a significant increase in monthly income. The question text can be found 
in Appendix C. Migrants were randomly allocated into two groups: those who were told that their choice 
would be revealed to their family member, and those who were told that their choice would not be 
revealed. The family member referred to in the question was the person to be surveyed in El Salvador. A 
description of the treatments is presented in Figure 3.2. Because the treatment varies the ability of the 
recipient to monitor the migrant’s actions, I refer to this treatment as the migrant-monitoring treatment. 
This experiment exogenously varies the probability that recipients will observe migrant income 
and measures the extent to which migrants strategically take advantage of asymmetric information. The 
framework described in Section 2 predicts that migrants will send less money home when the probability 
their income will be observed is low. In the context of the experiment, this means that migrants whose 
choice is not revealed to the recipient should send less than those whose choice is revealed. However, 
following the predications of the framework, migrants should act strategically only when recipients can 
punish them for noncompliance. Migrant responses from the baseline survey will be used to proxy for 
recipients’ ability to punish migrants. Differences between the two groups—choice revealed and choice 
not revealed—should be evident only when those proxies indicate that the ability to punish exists. 
Figure 3.2 Migrant experiment: Treatments 
 
Source:  Author. 
Recipient Experiment 
The recipient experiment consisted of an incentivized remittance spending decision. The respondents in 
the El Salvador phone survey were told that because their family member in the United States participated 
in the study, they now had the chance to win a remittance worth $300. They had to decide what to spend 
the remittance on and were asked to split the $300 among four spending categories: restaurant meals, 
education, daily expenses, and health expenses. Recipient choices were limited to four categories for 
simplicity in the context of a phone survey. If among the winners, recipients would receive exactly the 
                                                       
10 In pilot surveys where migrants were not given restrictions, almost all chose to split the money in $100 intervals. 
11 Two prizes were awarded. If asked, surveyors told migrants the number of prizes and the date of the drawing. The first 
prize was awarded midway through survey work, and the second when survey work had concluded. Migrants were eligible for 
only one drawing.  
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allocations that they requested.
12 Prizes were awarded in kind. The median monthly remittance in the 
Ashraf et al. (2011) study was $325, so a $300 remittance is a standard amount for many recipients. The 
question text can be found in Appendix D. Two separate treatments were administered to recipients: the 
recipient-monitoring treatment and the recipient communication treatment. The two recipient treatments 
were cross-randomized, also allowing for the analysis of their interaction. They are depicted in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Recipient experiment: Treatments 
 
Source:  Author. 
Recipient Monitoring Treatment 
The recipient-monitoring treatment is parallel to the migrant-monitoring treatment. Recipients were 
randomly allocated into two groups: those who were told that their choice would be revealed to the 
migrant, and those who were told that their choice would not be revealed to the migrant. This treatment 
randomly varied the probability that recipient spending would be observed and measures the extent to 
which recipients strategically take advantage of this asymmetric information. The framework predicts that 
recipients are more likely to strategically deviate by spending less according to the migrant’s preferences 
when the probability that spending will be observed is low. Therefore, the results of the experiment 
should show that recipients make choices closer to migrant preferences when those choices are revealed 
to the migrant. However, this effect will be present only in pairs where the migrant can punish the 
recipient for noncompliance. 
Recipient Communication Treatment 
During the US survey, migrants were told about the lottery for recipients and asked what their preferences 
were for how the recipients would spend the money. Again, recipients were randomly allocated into two 
groups: those for whom the migrant’s preferences were revealed and those for whom the migrant’s 
preferences were not revealed. Making these preferences clear is a proxy for improving communication, 
                                                       
12 Four prizes were awarded. If asked, surveyors told recipients the number of prizes and the date of the drawing. Two prizes 
were awarded midway through survey work and the other two when survey work had concluded. Recipients were eligible for 
only one drawing. 
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so the experiment exogenously improves communication about migrant preferences for expenditures. 
This treatment is therefore a test of whether or not communication costs can lead to inadvertent deviation 
from migrant preferences by the recipient. Revealing migrant preferences to the recipient should decrease 
the difference between the recipients’ choices and the migrants’ preferences when communication 
problems exist. 
Experiment Logistics 
For the experiment to work as intended, respondents must have believed that the threat of revealing their 
choices to their family members was credible. Because the interviewer collected contact information for 
the recipient families from the migrants and allowed the migrants to use a project phone during the 
interview to call their family members and tell them about the study, migrants were aware that their 
family members could indeed be contacted. Similarly, because recipients being interviewed knew that 
they had been contacted through the migrant, they also knew that their migrant family members could be 
contacted. Although it has no impact on the results of the experiment, for all respondents in the choice-
revealed treatment groups of the monitoring treatments, an effort was made to inform their family 
member of the choice made by the participant. 
The randomization in this study was performed at the participant level. Surveys were preassigned 
treatment status, and migrant and recipient treatments were randomized separately. Because remittance 
behavior can vary by season, it was important to ensure that treatments were balanced over time. I 
achieved this by stratifying the randomization for all treatments within groups of 16 surveys and by the 
treatment offered in the companion experiment. The recipient treatments were additionally stratified by 
the migrant treatment. 
Threats to Interpretation 
Although the experimental methodology used in this paper allows for the causal identification of the 
effects of information asymmetries that are otherwise difficult to isolate, several aspects of the design 
could lead to arguments that participants’ behavior in the experiment is not the same as it would be in 
their day-to-day lives. The first of these is that the experiments, particularly the migrant experiment, ask 
participants to make decisions about windfall income that is given to them rather than earned, and 
therefore migrants may be more generous with this income than they would be with other income. There 
are several responses to this. First, although it is true that the income in the experiment is transitory and 
not permanent, many of the migrants in this study work in jobs where income is highly variable from 
month to month, making transitory versus permanent income a less important distinction. Second, studies 
that have examined earned versus unearned windfall income have found that people are more generous 
with unearned winnings but that the effect is small (Jakiela 2009). Finally, the focus of this paper is not 
on the total amount sent by the migrants but on the effect of the monitoring treatment on the amount sent. 
The issues discussed here should apply equally to each treatment group. If anything, if migrants in the 
choice-not-revealed group do indeed have a greater ability to keep the funds for themselves, the impact of 
the monitoring treatment should increase as migrants feel more ownership over the winnings, meaning 
that the results in this paper can be considered a lower bound on the true effect. 
A second potential issue is that in both the migrant and the recipient experiments, prizes were 
awarded by lottery, meaning that the expected value of the prize for each participant is much lower than 
the value of the actual prize. Participants may be more generous or less likely to make controversial 
decisions because they know they are unlikely to win the lottery prize. Little research has been done into 
how subjects react to lottery prizes, but some evidence does exist. Laury (2005) conducts a laboratory 
experiment in which respondents make the same choices when payoffs are random as when payoffs are 
guaranteed. Additionally, because the questions in this paper relate to the differences between the 
treatment groups, if the lottery does impact participants’ decisions, the estimated effect can be considered 
to be a lower bound.   
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The final issue is that of the fungibility of choices made during the experiment. Both migrants 
and recipients could potentially undo their choices during the experiment through their actions afterward. 
For example, migrants could choose to not send a remittance that they would have sent otherwise. 
Although some of this behavior may be occurring, it is not necessarily important for the interpretation of 
the treatment. If the results show differences between the two treatments then that is evidence that people 
are reacting to variations in information.
13  
                                                       
13 Even without evidence of differences between treatments, if participants wish to do something that their partner would 
disagree with, it makes sense for them to take advantage of the experiment to do so, when the probability of keeping that action 
secret is high.  
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4.  DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
Data 
The migrant baseline survey collected information on demographics, characteristics of migrant family 
relationships both in the United States and in El Salvador, detailed information on remittances sent by the 
migrant to the recipient household and to other households, and a set of questions to assess the quality of 
the migrant’s relationship with the recipient household and the migrant’s involvement in household 
affairs. The recipient survey, administered by phone, was shorter and contained demographic information, 
some limited questions on remittances received from the migrant, and information on the education of 
children in the household. 
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics from both surveys: 1,581 migrant surveys and 1,298 recipient 
surveys were performed, a completion rate of 82 percent for the recipient surveys. For the migrant survey, 
summary statistics are shown for both the full sample and the sample with completed recipient surveys. 
No meaningful differences are evident between the two samples; therefore, I limit the analysis sample to 
the 1,298 migrant–recipient pairs with completed El Salvador surveys. Results from the migrant 
experiment do not change significantly between the two samples. Additionally, I show that attrition from 
the full sample of migrant surveys to the sample of completed recipient surveys is not related to treatment 
status (Tables 4.2 and 4.3). The breakdown of participants in the final analysis sample into the different 
treatment groups can be seen in Figure 3.2 (migrant experiment) and Figure 3.3 (recipient experiment). 
Table 4.1 Baseline summary statistics 
 
All observations 
Observations  
with completed  
recipient survey 
   Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD  N 
Baseline variables from migrant survey                   
Migrant is female  0.50  0.50  1,581  0.51  0.50  1,298 
Migrant age  36.83  9.41  1,538  36.92  9.29  1,264 
Migrant can read and write  0.96  0.20  1,554  0.96  0.20  1,275 
Migrant’s years of education  9.08  4.67  1,560  9.01  4.67  1,282 
Migrant’s years in the United States  11.31  6.38  1,577  11.13  6.27  1,295 
Migrant is married  0.62  0.48  1,575  0.63  0.48  1,294 
Migrant lives with spouse  0.49  0.50  1,579  0.50  0.50  1,296 
Migrant’s total number of children  2.28  1.69  1,579  2.34  1.69  1,296 
Migrant’s number of children in El Salvador  1.01  1.43  1,577  1.07  1.47  1,294 
Migrant’s number of children in United States  1.26  1.32  1,575  1.25  1.29  1,293 
Migrant’s hh size in United States  4.32  1.98  1,581  4.36  1.96  1,298 
Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador  0.32  0.47  1,581  0.34  0.47  1,298 
Recipient is migrant’s close relative  0.29  0.45  1,574  0.31  0.46  1,291 
Migrant has worked in last 12 months  0.89  0.31  1,581  0.89  0.31  1,298 
Migrant in lowest income bracket  0.52  0.50  1,429  0.53  0.50  1,181 
Migrant sent remittances to recipient hh  0.85  0.36  1,580  0.87  0.34  1,297 
Migrant’s annual regular remittances to recipient hh ($)  2,298  2,907  1,565  2,440  2,998  1,283 
Migrant’s annual irregular remittances to recipient hh ($)  337  706  1,575  344  707  1,293 
Migrant’s annual total remittances to recipient hh ($)  2,629  3,199  1,563  2,777  3,284  1,281 
Migrant’s annual total remittances to other hhs ($)  1,097  1,905  1,567  1,123  1,944  1,284 
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least weekly  0.69  0.46  1,578  0.71  0.45  1,295 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
 
All observations 
Observations  
with completed  
recipient survey 
   Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD  N 
Baseline variables from recipient survey                   
Recipient is target student 
     
0.45  0.50  1,298 
Recipient is student’s guardian 
     
0.40  0.49  1,298 
Recipient is female 
     
0.68  0.47  1,298 
Recipient age 
     
34.20  15.84  1,295 
Recipient is married 
     
0.36  0.48  1,298 
Recipient’s years of education 
     
9.37  5.27  1,292 
Recipient lives in urban area 
     
0.43  0.50  1,298 
Recipient’s hh size 
     
4.99  2.04  1,296 
Annual remittances received from migrant ($) 
     
1,522  1,916  1,203 
Baseline comparison variables                   
Migrant and recipient report same hh budget priorities 
     
0.48  0.50  1,231 
Migrant and recipient report same student GPA 
     
0.24  0.43  1,041 
Migrant and recipient report same student mode of transport 
   
0.43  0.50  1,107 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   SD = standard deviation; N = number; hh = household; GPA = grade point average. The “All Observations” sample is 
respondents with nonmissing data for questions in the migrant experiment. The “Completed Recipient Survey” sample 
additionally conditions on completion of the recipient survey and nonmissing migrant and recipient information for 
questions in the recipient experiment. Number of observations varies slightly with missing values. Recipient is defined 
as close relative if migrant reports recipient to be spouse, parent, or child. Migrants in the lowest income bracket chose 
$400 or less as the weekly income of themselves plus their coresident spouses. The other categories were $401–$600, 
$601–$800, and $801 and above. Annual regular remittances were collected by asking for the frequency of remittances 
sent and the average amount sent each time. Annual irregular remittances are remittances sent for special occasions or 
emergencies. The recipient variables in all cases refer to the person completing the recipient survey. The baseline 
comparison variables were asked on both surveys and are equal to 1 if the migrant and recipient responses match. Both 
respondents were asked to choose the three most important budget priorities for the recipient hh from a list of seven 
categories. Student refers to the student identified by the migrant during the baseline survey. GPA and mode of transport 
were only asked when student was reported to be in school. 
The migrants are half female with an average age of 38. 85 percent sent remittances to the 
recipient household in the last 12 months, indicating that most pairs in the sample have an established 
remittance relationship. Average annual remittances to the recipient household (reported by the migrant) 
are $2,629. Average annual remittances to other households in El Salvador are $1,059. The $1,600 
difference between average remittances to the recipient household and those to other households suggests 
that most recipient households are the migrant’s primary remittance recipient. The mean number of years 
in the United States is 11, so the migrants are largely established in the United States. In my sample, 32 
percent of migrants report having a son or daughter aged 22 or under in El Salvador, and 69 percent report 
communicating with the recipient household at least weekly. The sample is also low income; half of the 
migrants report earning $400 a week or less. Because of the structure of the project, the interviewed 
recipients are either the student identified by the migrant (45 percent) or the student’s guardian if the 
student is under 18 (40 percent). The remaining 15 percent of interviews were done with a different adult 
in the household if the student or guardian could not be reached. The recipient sample is heavily female 
(68 percent) because identified student guardians tend to be female.  
Because migrants were recruited in the Salvadoran consulate and screened into the study on the 
basis of having a young adult relative in El Salvador, a concern may be that the respondents are not 
representative of the larger migrant community and that the results are therefore not indicative of what 
might be found in a more representative sample. In Table A.1 in the Appendix, I compare characteristics 
of the migrants from the baseline survey (gender, age, time in the United States, household size, and 
education) to migrants in the 2008–2010 American Community Survey (ACS). I restrict the ACS sample  
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to non-US citizens aged 18 to 65 who live in the Washington, DC, metro area who are either Salvadoran-
born or Hispanic. The study participants are quite similar to the ACS samples, in particular to the 
Salvadoran-born sample, suggesting that study participants are not overly different from the greater 
migrant population. 
The random assignment of the treatments in this experiment allows for the causal identification of 
their impacts. Randomization should provide treatment groups that are the same on average so that any 
difference between the groups can be attributed to the treatment and not to some preexisting difference 
between groups. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 test whether the treatment groups are balanced on observed 
characteristics from the baseline survey for the treatment groups for the migrant experiment and the 
recipient experiments, respectively. In Table 4.2 the means for both treatment groups in the migrant-
monitoring treatment are presented in the first two columns, and the p-value of the hypothesis test of 
whether or not those means are equal is in the third column. Overall, the treatment groups are well 
balanced: Only 2 of 34 differences are significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. Table 4.3 
shows the means by treatment group for the two recipient treatments and p-values for differences in those 
means. Only 3 of the 34 p-values for the recipient-monitoring treatment and one for the recipient 
communication treatment are less than 0.10. Some differences between treatment groups may occur by 
chance, and these few small differences are not cause for concern. However, to allay any concerns of an 
unbalanced sample affecting results, I include regression specifications with control variables.  
Table 4.2 Balance tests: Migrant experiment 
   Treatment group means:  P-value for 
difference of 
means: Choice 
not revealed and 
choice revealed    
Migrant 
choice not 
revealed to 
recipient 
Migrant 
choice 
revealed to 
recipient 
Attrition          
Recipient survey completed  0.82  0.83  0.819 
Baseline variables from US survey          
Migrant is female  0.53  0.49  0.165 
Migrant age  36.90  36.94  0.941 
Migrant can read and write  0.95  0.97  0.150 
Migrant’s years of education  9.01  9.00  0.966 
Migrant’s years in the US  10.90  11.37  0.178 
Migrant is married  0.61  0.65  0.151 
Migrant lives with spouse  0.50  0.50  0.956 
Migrant’s total number of children  2.34  2.34  0.956 
Migrant’s number of children in El Salvador  1.03  1.10  0.365 
Migrant’s number of children in US  1.28  1.22  0.410 
Migrant’s hh size in US  4.34  4.38  0.720 
Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador  0.32  0.37  0.059 
Recipient is migrant’s close relative  0.29  0.33  0.178 
Migrant has worked in last 12 months  0.90  0.89  0.943 
Migrant in lowest income bracket  0.53  0.53  0.886 
Migrant sent remittances to recipient hh  0.87  0.86  0.586 
Migrant’s annual regular remittances to recipient hh ($)  2,494  2,386  0.520 
Migrant’s annual irregular remittances to recipient hh ($)  354  334  0.627 
Migrant’s annual total remittances to recipient hh ($)  2,828  2,726  0.579 
Migrant’s annual total remittances to other hhs ($)  1,059  1,185  0.245 
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least weekly  0.73  0.69  0.057 
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Table 4.2 Continued 
   Treatment group means:  P-value for 
difference of 
means: Choice 
not revealed and 
choice revealed    
Migrant 
choice not 
revealed to 
recipient 
Migrant 
choice 
revealed to 
recipient 
Attrition          
Recipient survey completed  0.82  0.83  0.819 
Baseline variables from recipient survey          
Recipient is target student  0.45  0.45  0.907 
Recipient is student’s guardian  0.42  0.38  0.160 
Recipient is female  0.69  0.67  0.331 
Recipient age  35.09  33.31  0.043 
Recipient is married  0.36  0.36  0.941 
Recipient’s years of education  9.21  9.54  0.285 
Recipient lives in urban area  0.43  0.44  0.649 
Recipient’s hh size  4.90  5.08  0.111 
Annual remittances received from migrant ($)  1,491  1,553  0.580 
Baseline comparison variables          
Migrant and recipient report same hh budget priorities  0.48  0.48  0.926 
Migrant and recipient report same student GPA  0.25  0.24  0.709 
Migrant and recipient report same student mode of transport  0.44  0.42  0.573 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   GPA = grade point average; hh = household. Sample is observations with nonmissing values for the experiment 
questions and completed recipient survey. Attrition is measured from sample of all migrants who completed the survey 
and the migrant experiment to sample with completed recipient survey and recipient experiment. Sample size for each 
comparison of means varies slightly by missing values for each variable. The percentage of missing values for each 
variable is also tested for balance across treatment groups with no significant differences. Other notes on variable 
construction are as in Table 3.1. P-values come from a regression of each variable on treatment, with standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 4.3 Balance tests: Recipient experiment 
   Monitoring treatment  Communication treatment 
 
Treatment group means:  P-value for 
difference of 
means: Choice 
not revealed 
and choice 
revealed 
Treatment group means:  P-value for 
difference of 
means: Preference 
not revealed and 
preference 
revealed    
Recipient 
choice not 
revealed to 
migrant 
Recipient 
choice 
revealed 
to migrant 
Migrant 
preference 
not revealed 
to recipient 
Migrant 
preference 
revealed to 
recipient 
Attrition                   
Recipient survey completed  0.81  0.83  0.315  0.82  0.83  0.730 
Baseline variables from US Survey                   
Migrant is female  0.52  0.50  0.532  0.49  0.53  0.186 
Migrant age  36.56  37.27  0.176  36.90  36.95  0.922 
Migrant can read and write  0.95  0.96  0.461  0.96  0.95  0.295 
Migrant’s years of education  9.02  9.00  0.947  8.97  9.04  0.798 
Migrant’s years in the US  11.18  11.08  0.774  11.13  11.13  0.993 
Migrant is married  0.65  0.61  0.175  0.63  0.63  0.952 
Migrant lives with spouse  0.51  0.49  0.543  0.50  0.50  0.957 
Migrant’s total number of children  2.30  2.38  0.352  2.37  2.31  0.560 
Migrant’s number of children in El Salvador  1.01  1.12  0.206  1.04  1.09  0.557 
Migrant’s number of children in US  1.27  1.24  0.725  1.31  1.20  0.105 
Migrant’s hh size in US  4.43  4.29  0.183  4.43  4.29  0.214 
Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador  0.33  0.35  0.366  0.34  0.34  0.885 
Recipient is migrant’s close relative  0.30  0.32  0.539  0.34  0.29  0.059 
Migrant has worked in last 12 months  0.89  0.90  0.401  0.89  0.89  0.950 
Migrant in lowest income bracket  0.51  0.54  0.229  0.53  0.53  0.934 
Migrant sent remittances to recipient hh  0.86  0.88  0.510  0.87  0.87  0.802 
Migrant’s annual regular remittances to recipient hh ($)  2,435  2,444  0.953  2,315  2,561  0.141 
Migrant’s annual irregular remittances to recipient hh ($)  382  308  0.062  353  335  0.655 
Migrant’s annual total remittances to recipient hh ($)  2,802  2,752  0.786  2,648  2,903  0.165 
Migrant’s annual total remittances to other hhs ($)  1,137  1,110  0.804  1,068  1,177  0.314 
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least weekly  0.73  0.69  0.192  0.70  0.72  0.585 
Baseline variables from recipient survey               
Recipient is target student  0.44  0.46  0.402  0.46  0.44  0.495 
Recipient is student’s guardian  0.42  0.38  0.239  0.39  0.41  0.319 
Recipient is female  0.68  0.68  0.998  0.68  0.68  0.726 
Recipient age  34.44  33.97  0.589  34.29  34.11  0.835 
Recipient is married  0.41  0.32  0.001  0.35  0.38  0.243 
Recipient’s years of education  9.22  9.53  0.294  9.30  9.45  0.622 
Recipient lives in urban area  0.41  0.46  0.061  0.42  0.45  0.312 
Recipient’s hh size  5.04  4.95  0.471  5.06  4.93  0.271 
Annual remittances received from migrant ($)  1,534  1,510  0.825  1,484  1,559  0.497  
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Table 4.3 Continued 
   Monitoring treatment  Communication treatment 
 
Treatment group means:  P-value for 
difference of 
means: Choice 
not revealed 
and choice 
revealed 
Treatment group means:  P-value for 
difference of 
means: Preference 
not revealed and 
preference 
revealed    
Recipient 
choice not 
revealed to 
migrant 
Recipient 
choice 
revealed 
to migrant 
Migrant 
preference 
not revealed 
to recipient 
Migrant 
preference 
revealed to 
recipient 
Baseline comparison variables               
Migrant and recipient report same hh budget priorities  0.46  0.50  0.189  0.47  0.49  0.401 
Migrant and recipient report same student GPA  0.25  0.24  0.844  0.24  0.24  0.952 
Migrant and recipient report same student mode of 
transport  0.41  0.45  0.228  0.43  0.42  0.671 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   GPA = grade point average; hh = household. Sample is observations with nonmissing values for the experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Attrition is 
measured from sample of all migrants who completed the survey and the migrant experiment to sample with completed recipient survey and recipient experiment. Sample 
size for each comparison of means varies slightly by missing values for each variable. The percentage of missing values for each variable is also tested for balance across 
treatment groups with no significant differences. Other notes on variable construction are as in Table 3.1. P-values come from a regression of each variable on treatment, 
with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
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The first row of Tables 4.2 and 4.3 also test whether attrition from the full sample of migrants to 
the estimation sample of migrant–recipient pairs with completed recipient surveys is related to treatment. 
Attrition is not significantly related to treatment for migrants or recipients. 
Estimation Strategy: Migrant Experiment 
The results of the migrant experiment can be analyzed by estimating the following regression using 
ordinary least squares: 
                                              (1) 
where        is the dependent variable indicating the amount that the migrant chose to send to the 
recipient.                 is the treatment indicator for the monitoring treatment, and it is equal to 1 
when the migrant’s choice is revealed to the recipient. The coefficient   is the averagdifference between 
how much migrants choose to send when their decisions are not revealed and when they are revealed. If   
is positive, migrants send more money to the recipients when                 equals 1.    are 
stratification cell fixed effects. There are 111 survey group stratification cells in all regressions. The 
inclusion of baseline control variables is not necessary for causal inference, but I will show specifications 
with controls to show that they do not affect the results. The control variables include migrant age, 
gender, education, household size, years in the United States, remittances to recipient household, and 
other migrant background characteristics.    is the error term, which I adjust for heteroskedasticity. 
Estimation Strategy: Recipient experiment 
Unless migrant and recipient preferences are different on average, regressions examining the impact of 
the treatment on the amounts allocated to the four different categories by the recipients will be 
uninformative. However, because the US survey collected the migrant’s preferences for the recipient’s 
choices for all participants, it is possible to examine the exact parameter described in the framework 
guiding the experiment: the extent to which the recipient’s choices match the migrant’s preferences. I 
implement this by calculating the absolute value of the difference between the recipient’s choice and the 
migrant’s preference in each of the four categories. I also create a summary measure across the four 
categories by summing the four difference variables and dividing by 2 to scale the total to 300. I refer to 
this as the total difference, and it is the primary dependent variable of interest. It is a measure of the 
number of dollars out of the $300 on which the migrant and recipient match. For example, a total 
difference of 100 would mean the recipient’s choices matched the migrant’s preferences on $200 of the 
$300, but that they allocated the remaining $100 to different categories.  
The results of the recipient experiment can be analyzed by estimating the following regression: 
                                                                           (2) 
where             is the difference between migrant preferences and recipient choices in each of the 
four spending categories or the total difference.                 is the treatment indicator for the 
recipient-monitoring treatment and is equal to 1 when the recipient’s choice is revealed to the migrant. 
                    is the treatment indicator for the communication treatment and is equal to 1 when 
the migrant’s preferences are revealed to the recipient before the recipient decides how to allocate the 
remittance funds. The coefficient    is the average difference in the difference between migrant 
preferences and recipient choices when the recipient choice is not revealed compared with when it is 
revealed. Similarly,    is the average difference in the difference between migrant preferences and 
recipient choices when the migrant’s preferences are revealed to the recipient compared with when they 
are not revealed. If, as predicted, revealing the recipients’ choices to the migrants and communicating the 
migrants’ preferences to the recipients causes the recipients to make choices more similar to the migrants’ 
preferences, then the difference variable will be smaller in the choice-revealed and preference-revealed  
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treatment groups, and    and    should be negative.    are stratification cell fixed effects (survey group 
and migrant treatment). Again, I also present specifications with control variables. I use the same 
variables as in the migrant experiment as well as recipient gender, age, education, household size, and the 
number of days between the migrant and recipient surveys.    is the error term, which I adjust for 
heteroskedasticity.   
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5.  RESULTS 
Migrant Experiment 
I first analyze the results of the migrant experiment in which migrants make an incentivized decision over 
how much of a potential $600 windfall to send to the recipient and how much to keep. Figure 5.1 shows 
the cumulative distribution of the amount sent by migrants, separately by treatment group. Because the 
experimental protocol limited migrants to splitting the money in $100 increments, the distributions are 
discrete. The first observation to be made from this figure is that the migrants send large amounts: More 
than half of the migrants in both treatment groups chose to send the entire $600 to the recipient. The 
other, smaller concentration in both distributions is at $300, where migrants decide to split the money 
equally between themselves and the recipient. Despite the fact that the two distributions follow the same 
basic shape, differences are evident. The percentage of migrants sending everything is smaller when 
choices are not revealed (53 percent versus 58 percent) and the percent of migrants choosing to send $400 
or less is higher (44 percent versus 38 percent). It is also easy to see that the distribution of the choices in 
the choice-revealed treatment group is always below the distribution of choices in the choice-not-revealed 
group; that is, the choice-revealed distribution stochastically dominates the choice-not-revealed 
distribution.
14  
Figure 5.1 Cumulative distribution of amount sent by migrant by treatment group 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   Sample is observations with nonmissing values for experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Choice not 
revealed: N = 648. Choice revealed: N = 650. 
The fact that almost all migrants in the choice-not-revealed treatment group chose to send 
something is consistent with the model presented in Section 2, where migrants who deviate when the 
probability their income will be observed is low still send positive amounts in remittances. The fact that 
most migrants in this group choose to send the entire $600 is suggestive that the altruistic component of 
remittances is high. However, the differences between the two distributions are evidence that information 
asymmetries also play a role. Migrants whose choices are not revealed are choosing to send less home. 
                                                       
14 The p-value on the two-sample Wilcox rank-sum for equality of distributions is 0.034. 
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These results are formalized in Table 5.1, which presents the results of estimating regression 
equation 1. Column 1 is a simple regression of the dependent variable on treatment status, and column 2 
adds the demographic control variables. All regressions include stratification group fixed effects. The 
results are robust to the inclusion of control variables. Migrants send $20 more when their choice will be 
revealed, which represents an approximate 5 percent increase over the choice-not-revealed group mean.  
Table 5.1 Impact of monitoring treatment on migrant remittance decision 
 
Dependent variable:  
Amount sent by migrant  
Variable  (1)  (2) 
Migrant choice revealed to recipient  20.40**  19.50* 
 
[10.27]  [10.26] 
Migrant is female 
 
–26.46** 
   
[11.09] 
Migrant age 
 
–0.487 
   
[0.741] 
Migrant’s years of education 
 
–0.119 
   
[1.225] 
Migrant’s years in the US 
 
1.968* 
   
[1.071] 
Migrant lives with spouse 
 
–28.75** 
   
[11.83] 
Migrant’s hh size in US 
 
1.293 
   
[2.800] 
Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador 
 
0.984 
   
[12.41] 
Recipient is migrant’s close relative 
 
–0.675 
   
[12.74] 
Migrant in lowest income bracket 
 
–21.73* 
   
[12.65] 
Migrant’s annual total remittances to recipient hh 
 
0.00319* 
   
[0.00192] 
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least weekly   
–1.122 
 
[12.68] 
Observations  1,298  1,298 
R-squared  0.133  0.159 
Mean in treatment = Migrant choice not revealed to recipient  441.4   
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   hh = household. Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with nonmissing values for all experiment 
questions and completed recipient survey. Amount sent by migrant is the amount that migrants chose to send when 
splitting $600 between themselves and recipients. All regressions include stratification group fixed effects: dummy 
variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization was stratified. Recipient is defined as close 
relative if migrant reports recipient to be his spouse, parent, or child. Migrants in the lowest income bracket chose $400 
or less as the weekly income of themselves plus their co-resident spouses. The other categories were $401–$600, $601–
$800 and $801 and above. Annual total remittances are the combination of regular and irregular remittances. Annual 
regular remittances were collected by asking for the frequency of remittances sent and the average amount sent each 
time. Annual irregular remittances are remittances sent for special occasions or emergencies. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1  
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Table 5.1 also reports the coefficients on the demographic control variables included in column 2. 
Five characteristics predict the migrant’s choice. Female migrants send on average $26 less than male 
migrants. Although women keep more on average than men, the effect of the treatment does not vary by 
gender (results not shown). Migrants who have been in the United States longer send more, although the 
effect is small. Migrants who live with a spouse send $29 less than those who do not. This is possibly 
because they are more likely to have their immediate family with them. Migrants in the lowest income 
bracket are estimated to send $22 less on average than those in the other income brackets. Finally, total 
annual remittances sent are positively correlated with amount sent in the experiment. The coefficient is 
small, but it suggests that migrant behavior in the experiment is related to real-world migrant behavior. 
The results in Table 5.1 show that information asymmetries can affect migrants’ remittance 
decisions and that at least some migrants take strategic advantage of a situation where the probability that 
their income will be observed is very low. The size of the effect (a $20 increase in amount sent) is not 
large, but it is similar to the size of the correlations with the demographic variables in Table 5.1. The 
effect size is also comparable to other experimental studies in families (Hoel 2013) and social networks 
(Leider et al. 2009; Ligon and Schechter 2012) that study the effects of making choices in dictator games 
known to the recipient. For example, Ligon and Schechter find that 91 percent of sharing in their 
experiment is related to altruistic motives. However, they also find that strategic behavior in their games 
predicts real-world strategic behavior, while altruistic behavior in the games does not predict any real-
world activity. This suggests that strategic behavior may in fact be even more important outside of the 
experimental context than within it. The effect size can also be compared with other studies with 
experimental designs that are not as similar. Jakiela and Ozier (2012) estimate a 4 percent kin tax on 
income in an experiment where participants sacrifice returns on income in order to keep it secret. 
Goldberg (2011) estimates a 7 percent sharing tax on income in an experiment where she compares the 
spending of the winners of public lotteries with that of the winners of private lotteries. 
The framework presented in Section 2 predicts that if recipients cannot threaten to punish 
migrants, no differences between treatment groups should be observed. Several variables from the 
baseline survey can plausibly be thought to proxy for punishment costs, and I examine how the treatment 
effect varies by these variables. I do not have a perfect measure of these potential punishment costs (and 
certainly one would be hard to obtain); but by showing a consistent pattern with all five of these variables 
the argument that ability to punish is important is convincing. The five variables, the predicted 
relationship with punishment ability, and the rationale for choosing them are described below. 
  Migrant years in the United States (negative correlation): A migrant’s reputation at home 
is important for migrants who wish to return, and the probability of return may decline 
with length of time in the United States. With time it is also more likely that the migrant 
has paid off any debts related to his initial migration costs. The median number of years 
in the United States is 10.  
  Migrant has a child 22 or under in El Salvador (positive correlation): Migrants may have 
left children in the care of the recipient, and the possibility of child care that does not 
meet the migrant’s preferences could be a powerful tool; 34 percent of migrants have a 
son or daughter aged 22 or under in El Salvador. 
15 
  Migrant and recipient are closely related (positive): This is defined as spouses or parent 
and child. Migrants may have entrusted recipients with the care of things that are 
important to them, and positive relationships with the recipients may be valuable to the 
migrants; 31 percent of migrants and recipients are closely related.  
  Migrant communicates with recipient household weekly (positive correlation): Frequent 
communication is a sign that migrants value their relationships with recipients; 71 percent 
of migrants report communicating weekly with the recipient household. 
                                                       
15 The 22-and-under cutoff is used because it was available on the survey that measured the number of young relatives up to 
college age the migrant had in El Salvador.   
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  Remittances sent by migrant to recipient household (positive correlation): Because 
remittance relationships where recipients induce migrants to send money result in higher 
payments, higher remittances may indicate high punishment costs. The median annual 
remittance total to the recipient household reported by the migrant is $1,800. 
Although these variables are all plausible proxies for punishment costs, given that they generally 
indicate a stronger or closer relationship between migrant and recipient, arguably they may also be 
proxies for higher levels of altruism. It is true that in general punishment costs and altruism may be 
correlated, but as described in the framework, altruistic remittances should not be affected by variations in 
monitoring. In other words, if these variables were proxies for only altruism and not punishment ability, 
the treatment effect of monitoring in the high-altruism subgroups should not be higher than in low-
altruism subgroups. Additionally, the mean amount sent in the group where decisions are not revealed is 
in every case lower in the high-punishment-cost subgroups than in the low-punishment-cost subgroups. 
Because payments in the choice-not-revealed group should be largely motivated by altruism, this is 
evidence that the variables chosen are representing more than just higher levels of altruism. 
Table 5.2 presents regression results by subsamples of these variables. For the continuous 
variables (years in the United States and remittances) the sample is split at the sample median, and for the 
binary variables (child in El Salvador, close relationship, and weekly communication) the sample is split 
according to the two values of the variable. The results are striking in that for each of these variables, the 
treatment effects are almost entirely concentrated in the subsample where punishment costs should be 
higher (columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10). These treatment effects are larger and more precisely estimated than 
in the full sample: Depending on the subsample, coefficients range from $32 to $59 more sent when the 
choice is revealed. These numbers are about 7–14 percent of the average amount sent in the choice-not-
revealed group. In the subsamples where punishment costs should be low (columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9), the 
coefficients are mostly small and do not approach statistical significance. The table also reports the p-
values on the test for equality of the treatment effects in the two subsamples for each of the five proxy 
variables. Two of the five coefficient pairs in both panels are statistically significantly different from each 
other. Alternate specifications that use the first principal component of the five proxy variables as a 
summary measure or interact the proxy variables with the treatment indicator in the full sample yield 
similar results. These results are consistent with the model’s prediction that when punishment costs are 
low, variation in the observability of migrant income will not affect migrant remittance decisions. 
An alternative explanation of the results in the migrant experiment is that migrants simply care 
about being perceived as altruistic and use the choice-revealed treatment to signal that altruism to their 
family. This concept of signaling altruism was developed by Bénabou and Tirole (2006). I cannot 
definitively rule this out, but the results suggest that it is unlikely. The strong patterns of heterogeneity by 
subgroup are directly connected to the framework presented here, but it is not obvious how they would 
relate to a story about signaling. To be consistent with the subgroup results, the variables that describe 
recipient punishment ability would also have to represent groups to which migrants care about appearing 
altruistic. However, across all subgroups, the migrants’ allocations in the not-revealed treatment group are 
high, suggesting that most migrants are altruistic. If the signaling story was true, it would then have to be 
the case that true altruism and the desire to signal altruistic behavior were not correlated.
16 
   
                                                       
16 Although the context is different, in an experiment studying the social networks of Harvard students, Leider et al. (2009) 
are able to definitely rule out the signaling explanation for non-anonymous giving in favor of one based on reciprocity and future 
interactions.  
23 
Table 5.2 Impact of monitoring treatment on amount sent by migrant: By proxies for punishment 
ability 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
 
Dependent variable: amount sent by migrant 
  
Years in the 
United States 
Migrant has child 
22 or under in El 
Salvador 
Recipient is 
close relative of 
migrant 
Migrant 
communicates 
with recipient 
household weekly 
Migrant’s annual 
remittances to 
recipient 
household 
  
Above 
sample 
median 
Below 
sample 
median 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Below 
sample 
median 
Above 
sample 
median 
                      Migrant choice 
revealed to recipient  19.83  32.75**  10.45  59.12***  12.21  36.29*  9.414  24.97**  –1.532  36.98** 
 
[15.33]  [15.32]  [12.79]  [20.73]  [12.78]  [20.11]  [22.03]  [12.47]  [15.91]  [14.84] 
                      P-value for equality 
of treatment effect  0.551  0.040  0.318  0.573  0.077 
                      Observations  639  656  853  445  889  402  376  919  611  670 
R-squared  0.221  0.201  0.154  0.299  0.159  0.314  0.306  0.152  0.236  0.190 
Mean in treatment = 
Migrant choice not 
revealed to recipient 
457.8  426.1  449.3  424.3  444.4  433.9  449.4  438.4  447.0  437.5 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with nonmissing values for all experiment questions, 
completed recipient survey, and nonmissing values for variables used for division into subsamples. Amount sent by 
migrant is the amount that migrants chose to send when splitting $600 between themselves and recipients. All 
regressions include stratification group fixed effects: dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which 
randomization was stratified. Recipient is defined as close relative if migrant reports recipient to be his spouse, parent, or 
child. Annual total remittances are the combination of regular and irregular remittances. Annual regular remittances 
were collected by asking for the frequency of remittances sent and the average amount sent each time. Annual irregular 
remittances are remittances sent for special occasions or emergencies. The median years in the United States is 10 and 
the median remittances sent to the recipient household are $1,800. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Recipient Experiment 
Analysis of the migrant experiment found that migrants react strategically to variations in the ability of 
recipients to monitor their income. Previous literature examining information asymmetries in remittance 
behavior has suggested that migrant monitoring of recipients should also be important (de Laat 2008; 
Ashraf et al. 2011; Chen 2013). To look for these effects in the context of this experiment, I now turn to 
analysis of the recipient experiment in which recipients allocated a potential $300 remittance prize among 
four different spending categories.  
Mean amounts allocated to different spending categories by recipients and migrants are presented 
in Table 5.3. The first two columns show the mean amounts allocated by recipients broken down by the 
recipient-monitoring treatment, and columns 3 and 4 show mean recipient allocations by the recipient 
communication treatment. The fifth column shows the means of the preferences reported by the migrant. 
Across both recipients and migrants, education is the most popular choice.
17 Daily expenses are the next 
                                                       
17 The preference for education may be partly due to the fact that participants answered this question at the conclusion of a 
survey that was rather heavily focused on questions about education, meaning that they may have been primed to consider 
education. This is not necessarily a problem as there is no reason to believe that either migrants or recipients were more primed  
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most popular category, followed closely by health and finally restaurant meals. Migrants allocate less to 
education than recipients and more to daily expenses, health expenses, and restaurant meals, but no strong 
evidence indicates that migrants on average prefer different expenditure categories than recipients. 
Table 5.3 Mean amounts allocated to spending groups by recipients and migrants: Recipient 
experiment 
 
Means of recipient choices by treatment group: 
Means of 
migrant 
preferences 
 
Monitoring treatment  Communication treatment 
  
Recipient 
choice not 
revealed to 
migrant 
Recipient 
choice 
revealed to 
migrant 
Migrant 
preferences 
not revealed 
to recipient 
Migrant 
preferences 
revealed to 
recipient 
Amount allocated to 
          Restaurant meals  6.11  5.46  5.38  6.17  11.74 
Education  175.54  166.22  170.97  170.64  141.41 
Daily expenses  66.05  75.59  72.85  68.99  76.56 
Health expenses  52.30  52.73  50.80  54.20  70.28 
Observations  638  660  641  657  1298 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   Sample is observations with nonmissing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Means in 
columns 1 through 4 are from responses by recipients when asked to allocate $300 across four spending categories. 
Means in column 5 are responses from migrants when asked how they would like the recipient to allocate the funds. 
I utilize the data collected from both the migrant and the recipient to analyze how the treatments 
affect the pair-level differences between their choices. Table 5.4 shows the results from estimating 
regression equation 2. The dependent variables in columns 1 through 4 are the migrant–recipient 
differences in restaurant spending, education spending, spending on daily expenses, and health spending, 
respectively. The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is the total migrant–recipient difference. Column 
6 adds demographic control variables. The control variables are the same as those presented in Table 5.1 
with the addition of recipient gender, age, years of education, household size, and a control for number of 
days between the migrant and the recipient surveys. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                           
than the other.  
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Table 5.4 Impact of monitoring and communication treatments on recipient allocation decision 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Dependent variable: migrant–recipient difference in…  Dependent variable: 
 Treatment 
Restaurant 
spending 
Education 
spending 
Daily expenses 
spending 
Health 
spending 
Total migrant–recipient 
difference 
Recipient choice revealed to 
migrant  –0.999  4.287  4.001  –1.251  3.019  3.330 
 
[2.141]  [4.922]  [4.206]  [4.234]  [4.775]  [4.827] 
Migrant preference revealed 
to recipient  –2.741  –14.18***  –6.154  –4.137  –13.61***  –13.69*** 
 
[2.119]  [4.936]  [4.228]  [4.196]  [4.753]  [4.818] 
              Observations  1,298  1,298  1,298  1,298  1,298  1,298 
R-squared  0.101  0.104  0.092  0.091  0.105  0.122 
Mean in recipient choice not 
revealed  15.9  107.3  78.0  75.0  138.1 
  Mean in migrant preference 
not revealed   16.7  116.3  83.0  76.6  146.2 
  Control variables  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with nonmissing values for all experiment questions and 
completed recipient survey. Dependent variables are the absolute difference between the recipient’s choice and the 
migrant’s preferences in each category. The total difference is the sum across the four difference variables for each 
observation, divided by 2. All regressions include stratification group fixed effects: dummy variables for the groups of 
survey numbers within which randomization was stratified and treatment status in the migrant experiment. Control 
variables are migrant and recipient gender, age, years of education, and household size. Controls also include migrant 
years in the United States, whether migrant lives with spouse, whether migrant has a child 22 or under in El Salvador, 
whether the migrant and recipient are close relatives, if the migrant is in the lowest income bracket, annual total 
remittances to recipient household, whether the migrant and recipient communicate at least weekly, and the number of 
days between migrant and recipient surveys. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
For both the monitoring and the communication treatments, the prediction is that the difference 
will be smaller in the revealed treatment group. When the probability is high that spending choices will be 
observed or when recipients are well informed about migrant preferences, recipients should more greatly 
adhere to those preferences. This prediction is not borne out for the monitoring treatment. For all 
spending categories and the total difference across specifications, the coefficients for the monitoring 
treatment are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. However, differences are evident for the 
communication treatment. For all spending categories, the coefficient on the variable indicating that the 
migrant preference was revealed to the recipient is negative. This means that the differences between 
recipient choices and migrant preferences are smaller when the migrants’ preferences are revealed than 
when they are not. Of all the spending categories, only the difference for education (column 3) is 
statistically significant, but importantly, so is the total difference (columns 5 and 6), implying that 
migrant and recipient choices are getting closer together overall. Across specifications the results indicate 
that there is a $14 reduction in the total difference when the migrant’s preferences are revealed. This 
represents about a 10 percent reduction relative to the mean in the preference-not-revealed group. The 
effect is driven by the difference in education spending, with the corresponding reductions in the 
differences in other categories being split between daily and health expenses and, to a lesser extent, 
spending on restaurant meals.  
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I also examine the interaction of the two treatments (results not shown) and find that the impact 
of the communication treatment does not vary with the monitoring treatment. There is also no consistent 
pattern of variation when the results of the monitoring treatment are examined by punishment ability 
(results not shown). This is not surprising given the very small estimated coefficients in the in the full 
sample. 
The impact of the communication treatment suggests that migrant preferences do matter to 
recipients and that some deviation from those preferences may be inadvertent. However, the lack of 
impact of the monitoring treatment further implies that recipients do not react strategically to changes in 
the probability of detection. The framework presented in Section 2 proposes an explanation for why 
recipients may not take advantage of the opportunity to hide their spending choices from migrants. 
Migrants simply may have limited ability to punish the recipients for not following their preferences. 
While the results in the migrant experiment are that recipient ability to punish varies across recipients, 
these results from the recipient experiment suggest that, in this context, migrant ability to punish is low 
across the population. In practice, this would result in a situation where the migrants have very little 
power to compel recipients to spend the remittances as they wish. 
Although a limited ability to punish is the explanation for the lack of effect of the monitoring 
treatment that is suggested by the framework, it is important to consider other possible explanations. The 
first alternative explanation is that migrant monitoring of recipients is essentially perfect and that 
recipients know that their choices will be discovered if they win. However, some information collected on 
the baseline survey suggests that this is not the case. Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of some 
questions that aimed to measure migrant knowledge of the recipient household. Only 24 percent of 
migrants could correctly report student grade point average (GPA), and 43 percent correctly report how 
students travel to school; therefore it does not seem plausible that existing monitoring is good enough 
across the board to render the experimental variation irrelevant. A second explanation is that migrants and 
recipients have the same preferences for spending, and therefore they make the same choices regardless of 
punishment ability. This may be true for some families, but if it were true for most, there should be no 
impact of the communication treatment. Additionally, only 48 percent of migrant–recipient pairs report 
the same three budget priorities (Table 4.1), further evidence of heterogeneity in preferences. 
A potential criticism of the results in the communication experiment is that recipients respond to 
the information about migrant preferences not because they necessarily want to follow migrant 
preferences but because they are reacting to being given a suggested allocation for the choice they are 
making. In other words, recipients may have reacted in the same way even if the suggested preferences 
were attributed to someone besides the migrant. I can address this concern by examining heterogeneity in 
the effects of the communication treatment by proxies for the quality of information in the relationship. 
Specifically, in Table A.2 in the Appendix, I estimate regression equation 2 separately by whether or not 
the migrant can correctly report the student’s GPA and mode of transport to school. Although these 
variables are not direct representations of recipient knowledge of migrant preferences, they are likely to 
indicate low information quality in general. If recipients are reacting to a lack of knowledge of the 
migrants’ preferences, the effects of the communication treatment should be concentrated among pairs 
where these variables suggest that information quality is low. I find that this is indeed the case: Effects of 
the communication treatment are evident only among migrants who do not know students’ GPAs or 
modes of transportation to school. 
Discussion 
Economic studies of information asymmetries in households with migrants have until now focused on 
migrant monitoring of recipient behavior (Chen 2013; de Laat 2008) and the impacts of offering migrants 
greater control over how remittances are spent (Ashraf et al. 2011; Chin et al. 2011; Torero and Viceisza 
2011). This is the first study that explicitly looks at the effect of information asymmetries on both sides of 
the remittance relationship—migrants’ sending of remittances as well as recipients’ spending of those 
remittances. Despite the previous emphasis on migrant monitoring, the results of the two monitoring  
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treatments presented in this paper are that, in this context, only migrants, and not recipients, strategically 
react to variations in the probability that their actions will be monitored.  
This is an important finding, not only because it shows that information asymmetries have an 
important impact on the remittance sending decision, but also because this implies that recipients have 
important power in the migrant–recipient relationship. Although this influence has been considered in the 
extensive literature on the motivations to send remittances, it has not previously been rigorously 
documented empirically. Policymakers who seek to design tools to facilitate the sending of remittances 
and enhance their impacts18 should consider the role of the recipient in determining remittance amounts. 
Policies that assume that migrants have complete autonomy over the manner in which remittances are 
sent may fall short of their full potential.  
The analysis in this paper indicates that because migrants are responding to the opportunity to 
hide income, some of them are already sending home more than they would choose to voluntarily. This 
implies that programs that seek to increase remittances further will face difficulties within this group. 
Policymakers should also consider the welfare implications of such a policy. The pressure that migrants 
face to send remittances is related to a growing literature on sharing pressures in family networks in 
developing countries. Recent work by di Falco and Bulte (2011) and Jakiela and Ozier (2012) suggests 
that the expectation that resources will be shared with extended family may inhibit individual economic 
progress. In this context, particularly given the low income status of the migrants, the results indicate the 
possibility that any potential extra remittance funds may be more efficiently used by the migrants in the 
United States than by their family members at home. 
Additionally, the fact that the monitoring treatment had no effect on the recipients’ spending 
decision adds a new angle to the recent work on the impact of control on remittance behavior (Ashraf et 
al. 2011; Chin et al. 2011; Torero and Viceisza 2011). To varying degrees, these studies offer migrants 
direct control over money sent to family members at home. Viewed through the framework presented in 
this paper, control over remittances improves both the monitoring and enforcement of remittance-
spending contracts, but the existing studies are not able to distinguish between the two channels. The 
results of this study—that migrant monitoring of recipient remittance spending does not seem to matter—
suggest that if migrants do desire control (and the literature is mixed on whether or not they do), this 
desire may not be due to an inability to monitor the recipients but rather to an inability to effectively 
punish recipients and therefore compel recipients to spend remittances in a certain way. In the absence of 
punishment ability, the ability to control would act as the enforcement mechanism in the migrant–
recipient contract.  
Overall, the findings that information asymmetries can affect both the sending and spending of 
remittances suggest that interventions or technological innovations that improve communication in 
transnational households could have important effects on financial decisions made by both migrants and 
recipients. In particular, the results of the communication experiment imply that for migrants who wish to 
change the spending behavior of their family members, policies that improve communication about 
spending preferences may be an inexpensive way to achieve a higher level of compliance with their 
preferences. Although this study addressed only the inadvertent impacts of information asymmetries in 
the context of preferences for the spending of remittances, it is possible that improving communication 
could also alleviate other possible inadvertent effects of information asymmetries in the migrant–recipient 
relationship. For example, if recipients do not have a full understanding of migrants’ cost of living in the 
United States, improving that knowledge could lead recipients to expect lower remittance payments. 
   
                                                       
18 See Yang (2011) for a discussion.  
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6.  CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes a set of experiments designed to test for the effects of information asymmetries in 
transnational households. First, an experiment among Salvadoran migrants in the Washington, DC, area 
examines the extent to which the probability that recipients will observe migrant income is a factor in 
remittance decisions. The migrant’s remittance decision is modeled as a combination of money sent for 
altruistic purposes and money sent because of an agreement with the recipient that is enforced with the 
threat of punishment. The model shows that variability in recipients’ ability to monitor migrants’ income 
can lead to migrants strategically deviating from this agreement when the probability that their deviation 
will be detected is low. When choosing how much of a potential prize of $600 to keep and how much of it 
to send to family in El Salvador, migrants send less to their family when the probability that their family 
member will be made aware of their choice is low. Consistent with the model, the effects are present only 
in subsamples of migrants where the cost of the punishment is plausibly high.  
A second experiment conducted among the family members of the migrant sample examines the 
role of migrant monitoring in the decisions that remittance recipients make about how to spend the 
transfers that they receive. The experiment varies whether or not the migrant will be informed of how the 
recipient chose to allocate a potential prize of $300. A simultaneous, cross-randomized intervention tests 
whether lowering communication costs by revealing the migrant’s specific preferences over the spending 
decision causes recipients to more closely adhere to these preferences. In contrast to the migrant 
experiment, recipient decisions are not affected by the monitoring treatment. However, lowering 
communication costs by revealing migrant preferences does bring recipient choices closer to migrant 
preferences. 
This is the first study to explicitly manipulate information asymmetries and causally identify their 
impacts on both sides of transnational households. Although previous work in this area has focused on 
how migrants monitor the actions of recipients or seek to increase control over the remittances they send, 
this study additionally recognizes that recipients have influence over how much is sent home by the 
migrant. In fact, in this experimental context, recipient influence on migrants is substantially more 
important than migrant influence on recipients, suggesting that recipients hold important power in the 
migrant–recipient relationship. The results also suggest that the desire for migrant control over 
remittances previously noted in the literature (for example, Ashraf et al. 2011) may not be due to the 
migrants’ inability to monitor recipients, but instead to the migrants’ inability to compel recipients to 
spend remittances as the migrant prefers. 
Although my results are specific to the context of transnational households, they can also inform 
the broader literature on household resource allocation. Whereas previous studies have focused only on 
strategic behavior, I find that both strategic and inadvertent information asymmetries can have important 
impacts on resource allocation. I also find that different types of decisions, analogous to the sharing and 
spending of resources, are affected by information imperfections. Finally, I bring the study of information 
asymmetries outside of the husband–wife pair. The heterogeneity in my results suggests that while the 
strategic effects of information asymmetries are important, they may not be relevant for all extended 
family networks where resource sharing is observed. However, even when strategic effects are not 
present, information imperfections can still have inadvertent impacts on the final allocation of resources. 
  
29 
APPENDIX A:  SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table A.1 Comparison of migrants in study with DC-area Salvadorans and Hispanics in the 
American Community Survey 
 
Baseline survey 
American Community Survey:  
2008–2010 3-year sample 
 Variable 
Salvadoran-born,  
not US citizen 
Hispanic,  
not US citizen 
Migrant is female  0.51  0.46  0.46 
Age of migrant  36.92  36.05  36.39 
 
[9.30]  [10.39]  [10.85] 
Migrant’s years in the United States  11.13  12.93  11.74 
 
[8.09]  [7.89]  [8.09] 
Migrant’s household size in the United States  4.36  4.95  4.64 
 
[1.96]  [2.12]  [2.14] 
Migrant has less than high school education  0.62  0.61  0.47 
Migrant has high school education or more  0.38  0.39  0.53 
Observations  1,298  2,208  5,420 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   Baseline survey sample is observations with nonmissing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient 
survey. Sample size varies slightly with variable: 1,264 for age; 1,295 for years in United States; 1,290 for education 
variables. American Community Survey (ACS) sample is the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) three 
year 2008–2010 ACS sample restricted to individuals aged 18–65 in the Washington, DC, metro area (as defined by the 
ACS, includes Maryland and Virginia suburbs). Standard deviation in brackets for continuous variables. 
Table A.2 Impact of monitoring and communication treatments on recipient allocation decision: By 
information quality measure 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Dependent variable: Total migrant–recipient difference 
     
  
Migrant correctly reports student 
grade point average (GPA) 
Migrant correctly reports student 
mode of transport to school 
Indicator  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Recipient choice revealed to migrant  2.248  3.501  –1.354  11.14 
 
[6.215]  [14.18]  [7.147]  [8.461] 
Migrant preference revealed to recipient  –16.77***  4.624  –23.99***  –4.349 
 
[6.147]  [13.94]  [7.351]  [8.413] 
P-values for equality of treatment effects: 
        Monitoring treatment  0.928  0.257 
Communication treatment  0.118  0.078 
Observations  787  254  633  474 
R-squared  0.157  0.397  0.228  0.243 
Mean in recipient choice not revealed  136.9  128.7  139.7  132.9 
Mean in migrant preference not revealed  148.5  132.2  148.5  140.7 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Notes:   Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample is observations with nonmissing values for experiment questions, completed 
recipient survey, and nonmissing values for variables used for division into subsamples. Responses to GPA and transport 
questions were recorded only if student was reported to be in school. Migrants were asked to report the student’s GPA 
within a 2 point (out of 10) range, while recipients reported an exact number. The migrant is said of have correctly 
reported the GPA if the recipient’s response was within the range the migrant indicated. All regressions include 
stratification group fixed effects: dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization was 
stratified and treatment status in the migrant experiment. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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APPENDIX B:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this appendix I more formally develop the theoretical framework described in Section 2 of this paper. 
As explained in the main text, the structure of the model is based on Chen’s (2013) description of how 
male migrants in China monitor their wife’s behavior. I adapt a simplified version of this framework to 
describe the outcomes considered in this paper.  
Migrant Remittance Decision 
I characterize migrants’ decisions to remit as being determined by both their altruism for their families at 
home and contracts with those same families, where the families compel the migrants to send remittances 
through the threat of potential punishment.
19 An extensive literature exists on the motivations of migrants 
to send remittances. Commonly cited motives include altruism, payments for services provided by the 
family, loan repayment, repayments of other investments made by the family such as education, desire to 
return home, and insurance (see Rapoport and Docquier 2006 for a review). These motives may operate 
simultaneously, and while there is empirical evidence to support the existence of them all, the literature 
has been less successful in defining their relative importance. The purpose of this framework is to model 
the remittance decision in a way that allows for both motivations that may be affected by strategic 
behavior and those that will not be. Although this model is not specific about the exact motivations for the 
remittances sent by migrants, the idea of a remittance contract enforced through the threat of a 
punishment cost encompasses most possible motivations previously examined in the literature. The clear 
exception is altruistically motivated remittances, which will enter separately in this framework.  
The model is constructed as a game with two types of players: migrants who send remittances, 
and members of their families who receive those remittances. Migrants and recipients both get utility 
from consumption, which is defined for migrants as migrant income ( ) minus remittances sent to the 
recipient (  , and for recipients as recipient income ( ) plus remittances received from the migrant ( ). 
Because they are altruistic, migrants additionally derive utility from the consumption of recipients.
20 
Migrant utility is then defined as 
       (              (         
 
and recipient utility as 
 
       (        . 
For both   and   ,        and        .   is the migrant’s altruism parameter and is between 0 
and 1.
21 In every period migrants earn either low income (  ) or high income (  ) where        .
22 The 
recipient strategy is to offer migrants a contract that specifies the remittance amounts that should be sent 
for each income level. Migrants then decide whether to comply with this contract or deviate from it. 
Migrants who deviate (and whose deviation is discovered by the recipient) will suffer a utility cost (  ) 
imposed by the recipient. This cost is assumed to be exogenous to the model but will vary across migrant 
and recipient pairs. Migrants and recipients know each other’s preferences and the value of     
   
                                                       
19 The incorporation of these two motives together in one framework is drawn from Lucas and Stark’s (1985) suggestion of a 
model of remittance sending that includes both altruism and migrant self-interest. 
20 For simplicity the framework does not include recipient altruism toward the migrant. 
21 Migrant altruism has been modeled in similar ways in Lucas and Stark (1985), Stark (1995), and Rapoport and Docquier 
(2006). 
22 Although variation in recipient income can affect migrant remittance decisions (as in Lucas and Stark 1985) for the 
purposes of this paper, I assume   to be fixed and low relative to migrant income.   
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First consider the case where migrant income is fully observable to both migrants and recipients. 
Migrant payoffs are as follows where    
 is the size of the remittance sent when the migrant complies and 
   
is the remittance sent when the migrant deviates.   is equal to   or   for the low- and high-income 
states: 
Comply:         (        
)       (       
) 
 
Deviate:         (        
)       (       
)      
The optimal values of    
 and    
are solved for using backward induction. First, given   and  , migrants 
choose    
 to maximize their payoffs when deviating, such that 
   (        
)        (       
). 
This first-order condition implies that migrants set the marginal cost of remittances equal to their 
marginal benefit. Any further increase in remittances will therefore incur a higher cost than benefit for the 
migrant and lead to a net loss in utility.
23 
To induce migrant cooperation, recipients will set    
at a level that is incentive compatible for 
migrants. In other words, the utility that the migrants get from complying with the contingent contract 
offered by the recipients must be greater than or equal to the utility they would gain from deviating and 
being punished. Because recipients wish to receive as much in remittances as possible, the incentive 
compatibility constraint will bind, and    
 will be set such that 
   (        
)       (       
)      (        
)       (       
)     . 
Because the contract is incentive compatible, the migrant will always comply. This condition implies that 
when   is greater than zero, the migrant will always send more than the voluntary optimum (   
     
). 
If       , then    
     
and the entire remittance payment is motivated by altruism. It is also important 
to note that    
 rises with   . The higher   , the more power recipients have to compel outcomes that 
are advantageous for them, namely, higher remittance payments.  
Asymmetric Information 
Now consider the case where recipients have imperfect information about migrant income. At the time of 
the remittance, the only information about migrant income that recipients have is what they are told by 
migrants. However, after the remittance is sent, with probability   recipients will receive accurate 
information about migrant income, informing them of whether the migrants earned    or   .
24 Recipients 
who do not receive this information continue to believe what the migrants have told them about their 
income. This gives migrants who have earned    the opportunity to deviate without being discovered by 
claiming they earned    and sending the contracted amount for the lower income level (   
 .
25 With 
                                                       
23 I assume that conditions hold for    
to be nonnegative. For example, assuming that both   (  and   (  are equal to   ( , 
   
    if            .  
24 For example, imagine a situation where a migrant earns    because he finds some extra temporary work. The recipient 
may hear about this work from another relative or family friend living in the same community as the migrant in the United States. 
25 Note that nothing has changed for migrants earning   , as the imperfect information does not afford them any more 
attractive deviation possibilities.  
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probability       the recipients will not discover the true income level, and the migrants will not have to 
pay   . For migrants who deviate in this way,   is the probability that that deviation will be detected.  
Furthermore,   is not constant and can vary across time for each migrant. In every period the 
migrants know what   is; however, recipients have incomplete information about  , knowing only the 
distribution of its possible values. Assume that   can be either low (    or high (  ) and that the recipient 
believes that        with probability .
26 The payoffs for migrants earning    are now 
Comply:        (        
)       (       
) 
 
Deviate:        (        
)       (       
)        
When deviating the migrant will send    
 because that is the only possible method of deceiving the 
recipient and avoiding punishment.
27 
As in the case of observable income, with asymmetric information, recipients must set contracts 
that are incentive compatible for the migrants. This incentive compatibility constraint will vary by the 
probability that deviation will be detected. 
Periods when       : 
  (        
)       (       
)            (        
)       (       
) 
 
Periods when       : 
 
  (        
)       (       
)            (        
)       (       
) 
Because        ,    
 must be lower in periods when        than in periods when        in order to 
satisfy the migrant’s incentive compatibility constraint. Given that recipients do not know the value of  , 
they must satisfy the constraint for    in order to ensure participation in all periods. The constraint for low 
probability of detection periods will bind, but the constraint for high probability of detection periods will 
not. 
However, depending on the values of   ,   , and  , recipients have another option. They can 
offer a contract that binds on the incentive compatibility constraint in periods of high probability of 
detection but that is not incentive compatible in the low periods. The intuition is that recipients might 
have to lower the contracted amount (   
  so much to induce cooperation in all periods that they would 
be better off receiving a higher amount in only the high-probability of detection periods than the lower 
amount in all periods. If recipients offer the contract that is incentive compatible for all values of  , they 
will receive the amount that satisfies the constraint for    in every period,      
. If they offer a contract 
that is incentive compatible only for   , then when        migrants will deviate and the recipients will 
receive    
. However, when        the recipients will receive the higher amount that satisfies the 
incentive compatibility constraint for   (     
), meaning that they will receive (         
         
in 
expectation. Therefore, the recipient will offer the contract that is not incentive compatible for all types 
when 
                                                       
26 Continuing with the example where a migrant earns    because he finds some extra temporary work,   may be high if 
another migrant from the migrant’s home village has the same job and can relay this information to family members. 
27 Migrants could also deviate by sending    
and paying   for sure. It is possible that the utility of this strategy is greater 
than the expected utility of sending    
. This would lead to an incentive-compatible contract unaffected by information 
asymmetries and therefore will not be considered here.   
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  (         
         
. 
This framework describes a situation in which the optimal contract between migrants and 
recipients is not incentive compatible in all situations. This results in migrants acting differently 
depending on the probability that their income will be observed by the recipient. However, this will only 
happen when   is positive; if recipients do not have the power to punish the migrant, the entire 
remittance is driven by altruism and is not affected by variation in recipient ability to monitor migrant 
income. This can easily be seen in the migrant’s incentive compatibility constraints: when       ,    
vanishes and    
     
.  
In summary, the model results in the following predictions regarding the migrant’s remittance 
sending behavior: 
  Prediction 1: When the probability that recipients will observe migrant income is low, 
migrants earning high income may strategically take advantage of recipients’ imperfect 
and incomplete knowledge of their income to send less money home.  
  Prediction 2: In pairs where the recipient ability to punish migrants is low, migrants’ 
motivations for sending remittances are dominated by altruism, and these altruistic 
remittances are not affected by the probability that migrant income will be observed.  
Recipient’s Spending Decision 
I now consider the recipient’s decision about how to spend remittances in a separate framework that can 
be developed in a parallel way. The decision that recipients make is modeled as the extent to which they 
follow the migrant’s preferences for that spending decision. Recipients get utility from spending the 
remittance money on the things that they prefer, but they are also altruistic in that they get utility from 
spending remittances according to the migrants’ wishes.
28 Although recipient altruism is modeled here as 
the recipient’s getting utility from the migrant’s utility, the concept could also include recipients who 
follow migrant preferences simply because they want to. For example, they may value migrant advice on 
household budgeting and investment.  
Migrants offer recipients a contingent contract specifying the extent to which remittances should 
be spent according to migrant preferences. Recipients then decide whether to comply with or deviate from 
that contract. With probability   migrants will learn how the recipients spent the remittance; otherwise. 
they will know only what they are told by recipients (and believe that to be true).
29 Recipients who 
deviate and are discovered by the migrant will pay a utility cost   , which is the punishment that the 
migrant can impose on the recipient. Potential punishments include withholding of future remittances, 
social sanctions (to the extent that the migrant can impose them from a distance), and familial discord. 
The size of the punishment (  ) need not be equal to the punishment the recipient can use against the 
migrant (  ), meaning that one may well have greater influence than the other. 
In the equations below,   is what recipients would consume if they followed only their own 
preferences, and    and   are the extent to which the recipients follow migrant preferences when they 
comply with the contract (  ) and when they deviate from it (   .
30   is the recipient’s altruism 
parameter. Recipient payoffs can be expressed as follows: 
Comply:        (              (    
                                                       
28 For simplicity of exposition I ignore a third category of consumption: expenditures on which the migrant and recipient 
agree. Incorporation of this category does not change the qualitative predictions of the model. 
29 Migrants could find out about recipient spending behavior by, for example, communicating with other family members in 
El Salvador that may have knowledge of what the recipient has done. 
30 For example, imagine that a migrant sends a $200 remittance for which the migrant wants $100 to be spent on food and 
$100 to be spent on education. The recipient wants to spend $200 on home improvements. If the recipient actually spends $100 
on food and $100 on home improvements, the recipient has followed the migrant’s preferences on $100 of the $200 remittance.   
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Deviate:        (      )      (           
The probability of detection when deviating (    can be either low or high and varies across time. It is 
known to recipients, but migrants know only its distribution. As in the migrant remittance decision, this 
leads to a situation where migrants may offer contracts that are incentive compatible only when the 
probability of detection is high. 
Therefore, the framework results in the following predictions for recipient remittance spending 
behavior: 
  Prediction 1: When the probability that migrants will observe recipient spending is low, 
recipients may strategically take advantage of migrants’ imperfect and incomplete 
knowledge of their spending to spend less according to migrant preferences and more 
according to their own preferences. 
  Prediction 2: In pairs where migrant ability to punish the recipient is low, recipients’ 
motivations for spending remittances according to the migrants’ preferences are 
dominated by altruism, and this altruistic spending is not affected by the probability that 
recipient spending will be observed.  
The recipient choice is further complicated by the fact that barriers to communication may result 
in confusion on the recipient’s part over the migrant’s actual preferences and consequently in inadvertent 
(as opposed to strategic) deviation from those preferences. I will refer to these barriers as communication 
costs, but the concept is broader than just the cost of a telephone call. With distance, specificity about 
preferences may become difficult, migrants may feel uncomfortable expressing what they want, and 
recipients may sometimes have to make decisions without time to directly consult with migrants. Family 
members may also incorrectly assume that they know what the migrant would prefer. If these 
communication costs do play a role, decreasing them by making migrant preferences clearer could 
increase  , leading to the following prediction: 
  Prediction 3: Improved information about migrant preferences will increase the extent to 
which recipients follow those preferences. 
In sum, strategic deviation can be a feature of the optimal contracts between migrants and their 
family members. The extent to which deviation occurs will depend on the distribution of the probability 
of detection and the size of the punishments that can be inflicted. In addition, barriers to communication 
can lead to inadvertent deviation when recipients make remittance spending decisions. 
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APPENDIX C:  TEXT USED IN MIGRANT EXPERIMENT 
 
To thank you and your family for your participation in this study, now we are going to give you the 
opportunity to participate in two more lotteries. Let me tell you about them. 
Question 1:  
First, you have the chance to win $600. You can keep this money or you can choose to send some or all of it to name 
of person to be surveyed in El Salvador. However, you must tell me now how much you want to keep and how much 
you want to send, and if you win, the choice you make now will be carried out.  
Treatment 0: Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project, we cannot inform name of person to be surveyed 
about what you decide to do with the money. This means that your decision is a secret. Name of person to be 
surveyed will not be told how much you have decided to send and how much you have decided to keep.  
Treatment 1: Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project, we have to inform name of person to be 
surveyed about what you decide to do with the money. This means that your decision is not a secret. Name of person 
to be surveyed will be told how much you have decided to send and how much you have decided to keep. 
Let’s make this decision now. You have the following options: (surveyor shows options to migrant) 
 
 KEEP: $600    and    SEND: $0 
 KEEP: $500    and    SEND: $100 
 KEEP: $400    and    SEND: $200 
 KEEP: $300    and    SEND: $300 
 KEEP: $200    and    SEND: $400 
 KEEP: $100    and    SEND: $500  
 KEEP: $0    and    SEND: $600 
 
Question 2:  
Now I am going to tell you about a second lottery that is completely different and separate from the first one. 
Because you have participated in our survey, name of person to be surveyed will have the opportunity to win a 
remittance worth $300 and will need to choose how he/she would like to receive it if he/she wins. He/she cannot 
pick anything but must choose among the following categories: meals at local restaurants, education-related 
expenses, daily expenses like groceries, and health-related expenses. He/she can spend it all on one thing or break it 
up among different things. 
Name of person to be surveyed will decide how he/she would like to receive the remittance. However, we would like 
to know how you would prefer that name of person to be surveyed allocate this remittance. 
Spending category:  Amount: 
1.  Meals at local restaurants (ex: Pollo Campero, Burger King)   
2.  Education-related expenses (ex: supplies, uniforms, books)   
3.  Daily expenses like groceries   
4.  Health-related expenses (ex: medicine, doctor’s visits)   
Total (verify adds up to $300):    
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APPENDIX D:  TEXT USED IN RECIPIENT EXPERIMENT 
 
Question 1: Because name of migrant participated in our study, you now have the chance to receive a remittance 
worth $300. Some participants like you will be chosen to receive this remittance. However, this remittance can be 
spent on only a limited number of things. In order to participate you must tell me now how you would like to 
allocate the remittance among the following categories, and if you win, you will receive exactly what you have told 
me that you want. The categories are meals at local restaurants, education-related expenses, daily expenses like 
groceries, and health-related expenses. You can spend it all on one thing or break it up among different things. 
Treatment 1: You can choose anything that you like.  
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project, we cannot inform name of migrant about what you decide to 
do. This means that your decision is a secret. Name of migrant will not be told about what you decide to spend the 
money on. 
Treatment 2: When we spoke with name of migrant we asked him/her what he/she prefers for you to spend this 
money on and he/she indicated that he/she would like you to choose ______. However, you can choose anything that 
you like.  
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project, we cannot inform name of migrant about what you decide to 
do. This means that your decision is a secret. Name of migrant will not be told about what you decide to spend the 
money on. 
Treatment 3: You can choose anything that you like.  
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project, we have to inform name of migrant about what you decide to 
do. This means that your decision is not a secret. Name of migrant will be told about exactly what you decided to 
spend the money on.  
Treatment 4: When we spoke with name of migrant, we asked him/her what he/she prefers for you to spend this 
money on and he/she indicated that he/she would like you to choose ______. However, you can choose anything that 
you like.  
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we have to inform name of migrant about what you decide to 
do. This means that your decision is not a secret. Name of migrant will be told about exactly what you decided to 
spend the money on.  
 
Let’s make this decision now. How would you like to allocate this remittance among the following categories? 
Spending category:  Amount: 
1.  Meals at local restaurants (ex: Pollo Campero, Burger King)   
2.  Education-related expenses (ex: supplies, uniforms, books)    
3.  Daily expenses like groceries   
4.  Health-related expenses (ex: medicine, doctor’s visits)   
Total (verify adds up to $300):   
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